Deepak Sirone Jegan (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Michael Swift (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Earlence Fernandes (University of California San Diego)

A Trigger-action platform (TAP) is a type of distributed system that allows end-users to create programs that stitch their web-based services together to achieve useful automation. For example, a program can be triggered when a new spreadsheet row is added, it can compute on that data and invoke an action, such as sending a message on Slack. Current TAP architectures require users to place complete trust in their secure operation. Experience has shown that unconditional trust in cloud services is unwarranted --- an attacker who compromises the TAP cloud service will gain access to sensitive data and devices for millions of users. In this work, we re-architect TAPs so that users have to place minimal trust in the cloud. Specifically, we design and implement TAPDance, a TAP that guarantees confidentiality and integrity of program execution in the presence of an untrustworthy TAP service. We utilize RISC-V Keystone enclaves to enable these security guarantees while minimizing the trusted software and hardware base. Performance results indicate that TAPDance outperforms a baseline TAP implementation using Node.js with 32% lower latency and 33% higher throughput on average.

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Merge/Space: A Security Testbed for Satellite Systems

M. Patrick Collins (USC Information Sciences Institute), Alefiya Hussain (USC Information Sciences Institute), J.P. Walters (USC Information Sciences Institute), Calvin Ardi (USC Information Sciences Institute), Chris Tran (USC Information Sciences Institute), Stephen Schwab (USC Information Sciences Institute)

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AdvCAPTCHA: Creating Usable and Secure Audio CAPTCHA with Adversarial...

Hao-Ping (Hank) Lee (Carnegie Mellon University), Wei-Lun Kao (National Taiwan University), Hung-Jui Wang (National Taiwan University), Ruei-Che Chang (University of Michigan), Yi-Hao Peng (Carnegie Mellon University), Fu-Yin Cherng (National Chung Cheng University), Shang-Tse Chen (National Taiwan University)

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Compensating Removed Frequency Components: Thwarting Voice Spectrum Reduction Attacks

Shu Wang (George Mason University), Kun Sun (George Mason University), Qi Li (Tsinghua University)

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