Guy Amit (Ben-Gurion University), Moshe Levy (Ben-Gurion University), Yisroel Mirsky (Ben-Gurion University)

Deep neural networks are normally executed in the forward direction. However, in this work, we identify a vulnerability that enables models to be trained in both directions and on different tasks. Adversaries can exploit this capability to hide rogue models within seemingly legitimate models. In addition, in this work we show that neural networks can be taught to systematically memorize and retrieve specific samples from datasets. Together, these findings expose a novel method in which adversaries can exfiltrate datasets from protected learning environments under the guise of legitimate models.

We focus on the data exfiltration attack and show that modern architectures can be used to secretly exfiltrate tens of thousands of samples with high fidelity, high enough to compromise data privacy and even train new models. Moreover, to mitigate this threat we propose a novel approach for detecting infected models.

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Improving the Robustness of Transformer-based Large Language Models with...

Lujia Shen (Zhejiang University), Yuwen Pu (Zhejiang University), Shouling Ji (Zhejiang University), Changjiang Li (Penn State), Xuhong Zhang (Zhejiang University), Chunpeng Ge (Shandong University), Ting Wang (Penn State)

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WIP: Savvy: Trustworthy Autonomous Vehicles Architecture

Ali Shoker, Rehana Yasmin, Paulo Esteves-Verissimo (Resilient Computing & Cybersecurity Center (RC3), KAUST)

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SLMIA-SR: Speaker-Level Membership Inference Attacks against Speaker Recognition Systems

Guangke Chen (ShanghaiTech University), Yedi Zhang (National University of Singapore), Fu Song (Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences)

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Commercial Vehicle Electronic Logging Device Security: Unmasking the Risk...

Jake Jepson, Rik Chatterjee, Jeremy Daily (Colorado State University)

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