Dr. Barton P. Miller (Vilas Distinguished Achievement Professor at The University of Wisconsin-Madison)

Patching binary code dates back to some of the earliest computer systems. Binary code patching allows access to a program without having access to the source code, obviating the need to recompile, re-link, and, in the dynamic case, re-execute. In the early days, it was a bold technique used by serious programmers to avoid the long recompile/reassemble and link steps. Code patching required an intimate knowledge of the instruction set and its binary representation. Great advances have been made in simplifying the use of code patching, making it less error prone and more flexible. "Binary rewriters" were a great advance in the technology for modifying a binary before its execution. Early tools, such as OM, EEL, and Vulcan, enabled the building of tools for tracing, simulation, testing, and sandboxing. Moving beyond static patching, we developed "dynamic instrumentation", the ability to patch code into a running program. Dynamic instrumentation provided the ability to adapt the code to the immediate need, dynamically control overhead costs. We applied this technology to both user programs and operating system kernels producing the Dyninst and Kerninst tool kits. This technology formed the foundation of the Paradyn Performance Tools. Dynamic code patching continued to get more aggressive. We developed "self-propelled instrumentation", which inserts instrumentation code that propagates itself along the program's control flow as the program executes. At its best, this technique can provide very low overhead, detailed instrumentation in support of fault isolation and identification of intermittent performance issues. More recently, we have addressed a wide variety of issues related to binary code patching including analyzing and patching defensive and obfuscated malware, parallelizing the binary code parsing process to quickly patch huge (GB+) binaries, and efficient analysis and instrumentation of GPU binaries. Key to both static and dynamic patching are the interfaces. There is a difficult balance between providing an interface that abstracts the details of the code, often using control- and data-flow graphs and instruction categories, and an interface that exposes the details of the instruction set. Our primary interface is based on editing of the control flow graph, based on an editing algebra that is closed under valid control flow graphs. In this talk, I will discuss the development of code patching over the years, with examples from the various technologies (including our tools) and present results from our latest work in self- propelled instrumentation. I will also discuss interface abstractions and our work towards the goal of multi-platform interfaces and tools.

Bio: Barton Miller is the Vilas Distinguished Achievement Professor at UW-Madison Miller is a co-PI on the Trusted CI NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, where he leads the software assurance effort. His research interests include software security, in-depth vulnerability assessment, binary and malicious code analysis and instrumentation, extreme scale systems, and parallel and distributed program measurement and debugging. In 1988, Miller founded the field of Fuzz random software testing, which is the foundation of many security and software engineering disciplines. In 1992, Miller (working with his then-student Prof. Jeffrey Hollingsworth) founded the field of dynamic binary code instrumentation and coined the term “dynamic instrumentation”. Miller Miller is a Fellow of the ACM and recently won the Jean Claude Laprie Award in dependable computing for his work on fuzz testing. Miller was the chair of the Institute for Defense Analysis Center for Computing Sciences Program Review Committee, member of the U.S. National Nuclear Safety Administration Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Labs Cyber Security Review Committee (POFMR), member of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Computing, Communications and Networking Division Review Committee, has been on the U.S. Secret Service Electronic Crimes Task Force (Chicago Area) is currently an advisor to the Wisconsin National Guard Cyber Prevention Team.

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