Wentao Chen, Sam Der, Yunpeng Luo, Fayzah Alshammari, Qi Alfred Chen (University of California, Irvine)

Due to the cyber-physical nature of robotic vehicles, security is especially crucial, as a compromised system not only exposes privacy and information leakage risks, but also increases the risk of harm in the physical world. As such, in this paper, we explore the current vulnerability landscape of robotic vehicles exposed to and thus remotely accessible by any party on the public Internet. Focusing particularly on instances of the Robot Operating System (ROS), a commonly used open-source robotic software framework, we performed new Internet-wide scans of the entire IPv4 address space, identifying, categorizing, and analyzing the ROS-based systems we discovered. We further performed the first measurement of ROS scanners in the wild by setting up ROS honeypots, logging traffic, and analyzing the traffic we received. We found over 190 ROS systems on average being regularly exposed to the public Internet and discovered new trends in the exposure of different types of robotic vehicles, suggesting increasing concern regarding the cybersecurity of today’s ROS-based robotic vehicle systems.

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EnclaveFuzz: Finding Vulnerabilities in SGX Applications

Liheng Chen (Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; Institute for Network Science and Cyberspace of Tsinghua University), Zheming Li (Institute for Network Science and Cyberspace of Tsinghua University), Zheyu Ma (Institute for Network Science and Cyberspace of Tsinghua University), Yuan Li (Tsinghua University),…

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Efficient and Timely Revocation of V2X Credentials

Gianluca Scopelliti (Ericsson & KU Leuven), Christoph Baumann (Ericsson), Fritz Alder (KU Leuven), Eddy Truyen (KU Leuven), Jan Tobias Mühlberg (Université libre de Bruxelles & KU Leuven)

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Securing the Satellite Software Stack

Samuel Jero (MIT Lincoln Laboratory), Juliana Furgala (MIT Lincoln Laboratory), Max A Heller (MIT Lincoln Laboratory), Benjamin Nahill (MIT Lincoln Laboratory), Samuel Mergendahl (MIT Lincoln Laboratory), Richard Skowyra (MIT Lincoln Laboratory)

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FirmLine: a Generic Pipeline for Large-Scale Analysis of Non-Linux...

Alexander Balgavy (Independent), Marius Muench (University of Birmingham)

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