Ryo Suzuki (Keio University), Takami Sato (University of California, Irvine), Yuki Hayakawa, Kazuma Ikeda, Ozora Sako, Rokuto Nagata (Keio University), Qi Alfred Chen (University of California, Irvine), Kentaro Yoshioka (Keio University)

LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) is an essential sensor for autonomous driving (AD), increasingly being integrated not only in prototype vehicles but also in commodity vehicles. Due to its critical safety implications, recent studies have explored its security risks and exposed the potential vulnerability against LiDAR spoofing attacks, which manipulate measurement data by emitting malicious lasers into the LiDAR. Nevertheless, deploying LiDAR spoofing attacks against driving AD vehicles still has significant technical challenges particularly in accurately aiming at the LiDAR of a moving AV from the roadside. The current state-of-the-art attack can be successful only at ≤5 km/h. Motivated by this, we design novel tracking and aiming methodology and conduct a feasibility study to explore the actual practicality of LiDAR spoofing attacks against AD vehicles at cruising speeds. In this work, we report our initial results demonstrating that our object removal attack successfully makes the targeted pedestrian undetectable with ≥90% success rates in a real-world scenario where the adversary at the roadside attacks the victim AD approaching at 35 km/h. Finally, we discuss the current challenges and our future plans.

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TEE-SHirT: Scalable Leakage-Free Cache Hierarchies for TEEs

Kerem Arikan (Binghamton University), Abraham Farrell (Binghamton University), Williams Zhang Cen (Binghamton University), Jack McMahon (Binghamton University), Barry Williams (Binghamton University), Yu David Liu (Binghamton University), Nael Abu-Ghazaleh (University of California, Riverside), Dmitry Ponomarev (Binghamton University)

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Measuring the Prevalence of Password Manager Issues Using In-Situ...

Adryana Hutchinson (The George Washington University), Jinwei Tang (Clark University), Adam Aviv (The George Washington University), Peter Story (Clark University)

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DorPatch: Distributed and Occlusion-Robust Adversarial Patch to Evade Certifiable...

Chaoxiang He (Huazhong University of Science and Technology), Xiaojing Ma (Huazhong University of Science and Technology), Bin B. Zhu (Microsoft Research), Yimiao Zeng (Huazhong University of Science and Technology), Hanqing Hu (Huazhong University of Science and Technology), Xiaofan Bai (Huazhong University of Science and Technology), Hai Jin (Huazhong University of Science and Technology), Dongmei Zhang…

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