Jiska Classen (Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam), Alexander Heinrich (TU Darmstadt, Germany), Fabian Portner (TU Darmstadt, Germany), Felix Rohrbach (TU Darmstadt, Germany), Matthias Hollick (TU Darmstadt, Germany)

Apple has integrated satellite communication into their latest iPhones, enabling emergency communication, road- side assistance, location sharing with friends, iMessage, and SMS. This technology allows communication when other wireless services are unavailable. However, the use of satellites poses restrictions on bandwidth and delay, making it difficult to use modern communication protocols with their security and privacy guarantees. To overcome these challenges, Apple designed and implemented a proprietary satellite communication protocol to address these limitations. We are the first to successfully reverse-engineer this protocol and analyze its security and privacy properties. In addition, we develop a simulation-based testbed for testing emergency services without causing emergency calls. Our tests reveal protocol and infrastructure design issues. For example, compact protocol messages come at the cost of missing integrity protection and require an internet-based setup phase. We further demonstrate various restriction bypasses, such as misusing location sharing to send arbitrary text messages on old iOS versions, and sending iMessages over satellite from region-locked countries. These bypasses allow us to overcome censorship and operator control of text messaging services.

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EAGLEYE: Exposing Hidden Web Interfaces in IoT Devices via...

Hangtian Liu (Information Engineering University), Lei Zheng (Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace (INSC), Tsinghua University), Shuitao Gan (Laboratory for Advanced Computing and Intelligence Engineering), Chao Zhang (Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace (INSC), Tsinghua University), Zicong Gao (Information Engineering University), Hongqi Zhang (Henan Key Laboratory of Information Security), Yishun Zeng (Institute for Network Sciences…

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Vision: Towards True User-Centric Design for Digital Identity Wallets

Yorick Last (Paderborn University), Patricia Arias Cabarcos (Paderborn University)

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ReDAN: An Empirical Study on Remote DoS Attacks against...

Xuewei Feng (Tsinghua University), Yuxiang Yang (Tsinghua University), Qi Li (Tsinghua University), Xingxiang Zhan (Zhongguancun Lab), Kun Sun (George Mason University), Ziqiang Wang (Southeast University), Ao Wang (Southeast University), Ganqiu Du (China Software Testing Center), Ke Xu (Tsinghua University)

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