Jiska Classen (Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam), Alexander Heinrich (TU Darmstadt, Germany), Fabian Portner (TU Darmstadt, Germany), Felix Rohrbach (TU Darmstadt, Germany), Matthias Hollick (TU Darmstadt, Germany)

Apple has integrated satellite communication into their latest iPhones, enabling emergency communication, road- side assistance, location sharing with friends, iMessage, and SMS. This technology allows communication when other wireless services are unavailable. However, the use of satellites poses restrictions on bandwidth and delay, making it difficult to use modern communication protocols with their security and privacy guarantees. To overcome these challenges, Apple designed and implemented a proprietary satellite communication protocol to address these limitations. We are the first to successfully reverse-engineer this protocol and analyze its security and privacy properties. In addition, we develop a simulation-based testbed for testing emergency services without causing emergency calls. Our tests reveal protocol and infrastructure design issues. For example, compact protocol messages come at the cost of missing integrity protection and require an internet-based setup phase. We further demonstrate various restriction bypasses, such as misusing location sharing to send arbitrary text messages on old iOS versions, and sending iMessages over satellite from region-locked countries. These bypasses allow us to overcome censorship and operator control of text messaging services.

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Yuefeng Peng (University of Massachusetts Amherst), Ali Naseh (University of Massachusetts Amherst), Amir Houmansadr (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

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Jingwen Yan (Clemson University), Song Liao (Texas Tech University), Mohammed Aldeen (Clemson University), Luyi Xing (Indiana University Bloomington), Danfeng (Daphne) Yao (Virginia Tech), Long Cheng (Clemson University)

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Power-Related Side-Channel Attacks using the Android Sensor Framework

Mathias Oberhuber (Graz University of Technology), Martin Unterguggenberger (Graz University of Technology), Lukas Maar (Graz University of Technology), Andreas Kogler (Graz University of Technology), Stefan Mangard (Graz University of Technology)

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Hao Yu (National University of Defense Technology), Chuan Ma (Chongqing University), Xinhang Wan (National University of Defense Technology), Jun Wang (National University of Defense Technology), Tao Xiang (Chongqing University), Meng Shen (Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China), Xinwang Liu (National University of Defense Technology)

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