Hao Zhou (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University), Haoyu Wang (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications), Xiapu Luo (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University), Ting Chen (University of Electronic Science and Technology of China), Yajin Zhou (Zhejiang University), Ting Wang (Pennsylvania State University)

Due to the complexity resulted from the huge code base and the multi-context nature of Android, inconsistent access control enforcement exists in Android, which can be exploited by malware to bypass the access control and perform unauthorized security-sensitive operations. Unfortunately, existing studies only focus on the inconsistent access control enforcement in the Java context of Android. In this paper, we conduct the first systematic investigation on the inconsistent access control enforcement across the Java context and native context of Android. In particular, to automatically discover cross-context inconsistencies, we design and implement IAceFinder, a new tool that extracts and contrasts the access control enforced in the Java context and native context of Android. Applying IAceFinder to 14 open-source Android ROMs, we find that it can effectively uncover their cross-context inconsistent access control enforcement. Specifically, IAceFinder discovers 23 inconsistencies that can be abused by attackers to compromise the device and violate user privacy.

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An In-depth Analysis of Duplicated Linux Kernel Bug Reports

Dongliang Mu (Huazhong University of Science and Technology), Yuhang Wu (Pennsylvania State University), Yueqi Chen (Pennsylvania State University), Zhenpeng Lin (Pennsylvania State University), Chensheng Yu (George Washington University), Xinyu Xing (Pennsylvania State University), Gang Wang (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

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Trust and Privacy Expectations during Perilous Times of Contact...

Habiba Farzand (University of Glasgow), Florian Mathis (University of Glasgow), Karola Marky (University of Glasgow), Mohamed Khamis (University of Glasgow)

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Repttack: Exploiting Cloud Schedulers to Guide Co-Location Attacks

Chongzhou Fang (University of California, Davis), Han Wang (University of California, Davis), Najmeh Nazari (University of California, Davis), Behnam Omidi (George Mason University), Avesta Sasan (University of California, Davis), Khaled N. Khasawneh (George Mason University), Setareh Rafatirad (University of California, Davis), Houman Homayoun (University of California, Davis)

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An In-Depth Analysis on Adoption of Attack Mitigations in...

Ruotong Yu (Stevens Institute of Technology, University of Utah), Yuchen Zhang, Shan Huang (Stevens Institute of Technology)

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