Paul Agbaje (University of Texas at Arlington), Afia Anjum (University of Texas at Arlington), Arkajyoti Mitra (University of Texas at Arlington), Gedare Bloom (University of Colorado Colorado Springs) and Habeeb Olufowobi (University of Texas at Arlington)

The landscape of automotive vehicle attack surfaces continues to grow, and vulnerabilities in the controller area network (CAN) expose vehicles to cyber-physical risks and attacks that can endanger the safety of passengers and pedestrians. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) for CAN have emerged as a key mitigation approach for these risks, but uniform methods to compare proposed IDS techniques are lacking. In this paper, we present a framework for comparative performance analysis of state-of-the-art IDSs for CAN bus to provide a consistent methodology to evaluate and assess proposed approaches. This framework relies on previously published datasets comprising message logs recorded from a real vehicle CAN bus coupled with traditional classifier performance metrics to reduce the discrepancies that arise when comparing IDS approaches from disparate sources.

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PoF: Proof-of-Following for Vehicle Platoons

Ziqi Xu (University of Arizona), Jingcheng Li (University of Arizona), Yanjun Pan (University of Arizona), Loukas Lazos (University of Arizona, Tucson), Ming Li (University of Arizona, Tucson), Nirnimesh Ghose (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

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Time-Based CAN Intrusion Detection Benchmark

Deborah Blevins (University of Kentucky), Pablo Moriano, Robert Bridges, Miki Verma, Michael Iannacone, and Samuel Hollifield (Oak Ridge National Laboratory)

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Trust and Privacy Expectations during Perilous Times of Contact...

Habiba Farzand (University of Glasgow), Florian Mathis (University of Glasgow), Karola Marky (University of Glasgow), Mohamed Khamis (University of Glasgow)

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