Edwin Yang (University of Oklahoma) and Song Fang (University of Oklahoma)

With the advent of the in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) systems (e.g., Android Automotive) and other portable devices (e.g., smartphones) that may be brought into a vehicle, it becomes crucial to establish a secure channel between the vehicle and an in-vehicle device or between two in-vehicle devices. Traditional pairing schemes are tedious, as they require user interaction (e.g., manually typing in a passcode or bringing the two devices close to each other). Modern vehicles, together with smartphones and many emerging Internet-of-things (IoT) devices (e.g., dashcam) are often equipped with built-in Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers. In this paper, we propose a GPS-based Key establishment technique, called GPSKey, by leveraging the inherent randomness of vehicle movement. Specifically, vehicle movement changes with road ground conditions, traffic situations, and pedal operations. It thus may have rich randomness. Meanwhile, two in-vehicle GPS receivers can observe the same vehicle movement and exploit it for key establishment without requiring user interaction. We implement a prototype of GPSKey on top of off-the-shelf devices. Experimental results show that legitimate devices in the same vehicle require 1.18-minute of driving on average to establish a 128-bit key. Meanwhile, the attacker who follows or leads the victim’s vehicle is unable to infer the key.

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Demo #13: Attacking LiDAR Semantic Segmentation in Autonomous Driving

Yi Zhu (State University of New York at Buffalo), Chenglin Miao (University of Georgia), Foad Hajiaghajani (State University of New York at Buffalo), Mengdi Huai (University of Virginia), Lu Su (Purdue University) and Chunming Qiao (State University of New York at Buffalo)

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SoK: A Proposal for Incorporating Gamified Cybersecurity Awareness in...

June De La Cruz (INSPIRIT Lab, University of Denver), Sanchari Das (INSPIRIT Lab, University of Denver)

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F-PKI: Enabling Innovation and Trust Flexibility in the HTTPS...

Laurent Chuat (ETH Zurich), Cyrill Krähenbühl (ETH Zürich), Prateek Mittal (Princeton University), Adrian Perrig (ETH Zurich)

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Demo #10: Hijacking Connected Vehicle Alexa Skills

Wenbo Ding (University at Buffalo), Long Cheng (Clemson University), Xianghang Mi (University of Science and Technology of China), Ziming Zhao (University at Buffalo) and Hongxin Hu (University at Buffalo)

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