Christoph Kerschbaumer, Julian Gaibler, Arthur Edelstein (Mozilla Corporation), Thyla van der Merwey (ETH Zurich)

The number of websites that support encrypted and secure https connections has increased rapidly in recent years. Despite major gains in the proportion of websites supporting https, the web contains millions of legacy http links that point to insecure versions of websites. Worse, numerous websites often use http connections by default, even though they already support https. Establishing a connection using http rather than https has the downside that http transfers data in cleartext, granting an attacker the ability to eavesdrop, or even tamper with the transmitted data. To date, however, no web browser has attempted to remedy this problem by favouring secure connections by default.

We present HTTPS-Only, an approach which first tries to establish a secure connection to a website using https and only allows a fallback to http if a secure connection cannot be established. Our approach also silently upgrades all insecure http subresource requests (image, stylesheet, script) within a secure website to use the secure https protocol instead. Our measurements indicate that our approach can upgrade the majority of connections to https and therefore suggests that browser vendors have an opportunity to evolve their current connection model.

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PHOENIX: Device-Centric Cellular Network Protocol Monitoring using Runtime Verification

Mitziu Echeverria (The University of Iowa), Zeeshan Ahmed (The University of Iowa), Bincheng Wang (The University of Iowa), M. Fareed Arif (The University of Iowa), Syed Rafiul Hussain (Pennsylvania State University), Omar Chowdhury (The University of Iowa)

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Demo #5: Securing Heavy Vehicle Diagnostics

Jeremy Daily, David Nnaji, and Ben Ettlinger (Colorado State University)

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Tag of the Dead: How Terminated SaaS Tags Become...

Takahito Sakamoto, Takuya Murozono (DataSign Inc)

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Polypyus – The Firmware Historian

Jan Friebertshauser, Florian Kosterhon, Jiska Classen, Matthias Hollick (Secure Mobile Networking Lab, TU Darmstad)

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