Alessio Buscemi, Thomas Engel (SnT, University of Luxembourg), Kang G. Shin (The University of Michigan)

The Controller Area Network (CAN) is widely deployed as the de facto global standard for the communication between Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in the automotive sector. Despite being unencrypted, the data transmitted over CAN is encoded according to the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) specifications, and their formats are kept secret from the general public. Thus, the only way to obtain accurate vehicle information from the CAN bus is through reverse engineering. Aftermarket companies and academic researchers have focused on automating the CAN reverse-engineering process to improve its speed and scalability. However, the manufacturers have recently started multiplexing the CAN frames primarily for platform upgrades, rendering state-of-the-art (SOTA) reverse engineering ineffective. To overcome this new barrier, we present CAN Multiplexed Frames Translator (CAN-MXT), the first tool for the identification of new-generation multiplexed CAN frames. We also introduce CAN Multiplexed Frames Generator (CANMXG), a tool for the parsing of standard CAN traffic into multiplexed traffic, facilitating research and app development on CAN multiplexing.

View More Papers

MadRadar: A Black-Box Physical Layer Attack Framework on mmWave...

David Hunt (Duke University), Kristen Angell (Duke University), Zhenzhou Qi (Duke University), Tingjun Chen (Duke University), Miroslav Pajic (Duke University)

Read More

FP-Fed: Privacy-Preserving Federated Detection of Browser Fingerprinting

Meenatchi Sundaram Muthu Selva Annamalai (University College London), Igor Bilogrevic (Google), Emiliano De Cristofaro (University of California, Riverside)

Read More

On Precisely Detecting Censorship Circumvention in Real-World Networks

Ryan Wails (Georgetown University, U.S. Naval Research Laboratory), George Arnold Sullivan (University of California, San Diego), Micah Sherr (Georgetown University), Rob Jansen (U.S. Naval Research Laboratory)

Read More

EM Eye: Characterizing Electromagnetic Side-channel Eavesdropping on Embedded Cameras

Yan Long (University of Michigan), Qinhong Jiang (Zhejiang University), Chen Yan (Zhejiang University), Tobias Alam (University of Michigan), Xiaoyu Ji (Zhejiang University), Wenyuan Xu (Zhejiang University), Kevin Fu (Northeastern University)

Read More