Michele Marazzi, Stefano Longari, Michele Carminati, Stefano Zanero (Politecnico di Milano)

ZOOX AutoDriving Security Award Runner-up!

With the increasing interest in autonomous vehicles (AVs), ensuring their safety and security is becoming crucial. The introduction of advanced features has increased the need for various interfaces to communicate with the external world, creating new potential attack vectors that attackers can exploit to alter sensor data. LiDAR sensors are widely employed to support autonomous driving features and generate point cloud data used by ADAS to 3D map the vehicle’s surroundings. Tampering attacks on LiDAR-generated data can compromise the vehicle’s functionalities and seriously threaten passengers and other road users. Existing approaches to LiDAR data tampering detection show security flaws and can be bypassed by attackers through design vulnerabilities. This paper proposes a novel approach for tampering detection of LiDAR-generated data in AVs, employing a watermarking technique. We validate our approach through experiments to prove its feasibility in realworld time-constrained scenarios and its efficacy in detecting LiDAR tampering attacks. Our approach performs better when compared to the current state-of-the-art LiDAR watermarking techniques while addressing critical issues related to watermark security and imperceptibility.

View More Papers

Merge/Space: A Security Testbed for Satellite Systems

M. Patrick Collins (USC Information Sciences Institute), Alefiya Hussain (USC Information Sciences Institute), J.P. Walters (USC Information Sciences Institute), Calvin Ardi (USC Information Sciences Institute), Chris Tran (USC Information Sciences Institute), Stephen Schwab (USC Information Sciences Institute)

Read More

MirageFlow: A New Bandwidth Inflation Attack on Tor

Christoph Sendner (University of Würzburg), Jasper Stang (University of Würzburg), Alexandra Dmitrienko (University of Würzburg), Raveen Wijewickrama (University of Texas at San Antonio), Murtuza Jadliwala (University of Texas at San Antonio)

Read More

Compensating Removed Frequency Components: Thwarting Voice Spectrum Reduction Attacks

Shu Wang (George Mason University), Kun Sun (George Mason University), Qi Li (Tsinghua University)

Read More

Secure Multiparty Computation of Threshold Signatures Made More Efficient

Harry W. H. Wong (The Chinese University of Hong Kong), Jack P. K. Ma (The Chinese University of Hong Kong), Sherman S. M. Chow (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Read More