Rahmadi Trimananda (University of California, Irvine), Janus Varmarken (University of California, Irvine), Athina Markopoulou (University of California, Irvine), Brian Demsky (University of California, Irvine)

Smart home devices are vulnerable to passive inference attacks based on network traffic, even in the presence of encryption. In this paper, we present PINGPONG, a tool that can automatically extract packet-level signatures for device events (e.g., light bulb turning ON/OFF) from network traffic. We evaluated PINGPONG on popular smart home devices ranging from smart plugs and thermostats to cameras, voice-activated devices, and smart TVs. We were able to: (1) automatically extract previously unknown signatures that consist of simple sequences of packet lengths and directions; (2) use those signatures to detect the devices or specific events with an average recall of more than 97%; (3) show that the signatures are unique among hundreds of millions of packets of real world network traffic; (4) show that our methodology is also applicable to publicly available datasets; and (5) demonstrate its robustness in different settings: events triggered by local and remote smartphones, as well as by home automation systems.

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SymTCP: Eluding Stateful Deep Packet Inspection with Automated Discrepancy...

Zhongjie Wang (University of California, Riverside), Shitong Zhu (University of California, Riverside), Yue Cao (University of California, Riverside), Zhiyun Qian (University of California, Riverside), Chengyu Song (University of California, Riverside), Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy (University of California, Riverside), Kevin S. Chan (U.S. Army Research Lab), Tracy D. Braun (U.S. Army Research Lab)

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Locally Differentially Private Frequency Estimation with Consistency

Tianhao Wang (Purdue University), Milan Lopuhaä-Zwakenberg (Eindhoven University of Technology), Zitao Li (Purdue University), Boris Skoric (Eindhoven University of Technology), Ninghui Li (Purdue University)

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Poseidon: Mitigating Volumetric DDoS Attacks with Programmable Switches

Menghao Zhang (Tsinghua University), Guanyu Li (Tsinghua University), Shicheng Wang (Tsinghua University), Chang Liu (Tsinghua University), Ang Chen (Rice University), Hongxin Hu (Clemson University), Guofei Gu (Texas A&M University), Qi Li (Tsinghua University), Mingwei Xu (Tsinghua University), Jianping Wu (Tsinghua University)

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Towards Plausible Graph Anonymization

Yang Zhang (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Mathias Humbert (armasuisse Science and Technology), Bartlomiej Surma (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Praveen Manoharan (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Jilles Vreeken (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security), Michael Backes (CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security)

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