Peiyao Sheng (Kaleidoscope Blockchain Inc.), Nikita Yadav (Indian Institute of Science), Vishal Sevani (Kaleidoscope Blockchain Inc.), Arun Babu (Kaleidoscope Blockchain Inc.), Anand Svr (Kaleidoscope Blockchain Inc.), Himanshu Tyagi (Indian Institute of Science), Pramod Viswanath (Kaleidoscope Blockchain Inc.)

Recent years have seen the emergence of decentralized wireless networks consisting of nodes hosted by many individuals and small enterprises, reawakening the decades-old dream of open networking. These networks have been deployed in an organic, distributed manner and are driven by new economic models resting on performance-based incentives. A critical requirement for the incentives to scale is the ability to prove network performance in a decentralized ``trustfree" manner, i.e., a Byzantine fault tolerant network telemetry system.

In this paper, we present a Proof of Backhaul (PoB) protocol which measures the bandwidth of the (broadband) backhaul link of a wireless access point, termed prover, in a decentralized and trustfree manner. In particular, our proposed protocol is the first to satisfy the following two properties:
(1) Trustfree. Bandwidth measurement is secure against Byzantine attacks by collusion of challenge servers and the prover.
(2) Open. The barrier-to-entry for being a challenge server is low; there is no requirement of having a low latency and high throughput path to the measured link.
At a high-level, our protocol aggregates the challenge traffic from multiple challenge servers and uses cryptographic primitives to ensure that a subset of challengers or, even challengers and provers, cannot maliciously modify results in their favor. A formal security model allows us to establish guarantees of accurate bandwidth measurement as a function of the maximum fraction of malicious actors.

We implement our protocol with challengers spread across geographical locations and release the code~cite{multichallenger-pob}. Our evaluation shows that our PoB protocol can verify backhaul bandwidth of up to 1000 Mbps with less than 10% error using measurements lasting only 100 ms. The measurement accuracy is not affected in the presence of corrupted challengers. Importantly, the basic verification protocol lends itself to a minor modification that can measure available bandwidth even in the presence of cross-traffic.

Finally, the security guarantees of our PoB protocol output are naturally composable with ``commitments" on blockchain ledgers, which are commonly used for decentralized networks.

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