Kerem Arikan (Binghamton University), Abraham Farrell (Binghamton University), Williams Zhang Cen (Binghamton University), Jack McMahon (Binghamton University), Barry Williams (Binghamton University), Yu David Liu (Binghamton University), Nael Abu-Ghazaleh (University of California, Riverside), Dmitry Ponomarev (Binghamton University)

Protection of cache hierarchies from side-channel attacks is critical for building secure systems, particularly the ones using Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). In this paper, we consider the problem of efficient and secure fine-grained partitioning of cache hierarchies and propose a framework, called Secure Hierarchies for TEEs (TEE-SHirT). In the context of a three-level cache system, TEE-SHirT consists of partitioned shared last-level cache, partitioned private L2 caches, and non-partitioned L1 caches that are flushed on context switches and system calls. Efficient and correct partitioning requires careful design. Towards this goal, TEE-SHirT makes three contributions: 1) we demonstrate how the hardware structures used for holding cache partitioning metadata can be effectively virtualized to avoid flushing of cache partition content on context switches and system calls; 2) we show how to support multi-threaded enclaves in TEE-SHirT, addressing the issues of coherency and consistency that arise with both intra-core and inter-core data sharing; 3) we develop a formal security model for TEE-SHirT to rigorously reason about the security of our design.

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