Jaeho Lee (Rice University), Ang Chen (Rice University), Dan S. Wallach (Rice University)

A good security practice for handling sensitive data, such as passwords, is to overwrite the data buffers with zeros once the data is no longer in use. This protects against attackers who gain a snapshot of a device’s physical memory, whether by in- person physical attacks, or by remote attacks like Meltdown and Spectre. This paper looks at unnecessary password retention in Android phones by popular apps, secure password management apps, and even the lockscreen system process. We have performed a comprehensive analysis of the Android framework and a variety of apps, and discovered that passwords can survive in a variety of locations, including UI widgets where users enter their passwords, apps that retain passwords rather than exchange them for tokens, old copies not yet reused by garbage collectors, and buffers in keyboard apps. We have developed solutions that successfully fix these problems with modest code changes.

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ICSREF: A Framework for Automated Reverse Engineering of Industrial...

Anastasis Keliris (NYU), Michail Maniatakos (NYU Abu Dhabi)

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Automating Patching of Vulnerable Open-Source Software Versions in Application...

Ruian Duan (Georgia Institute of Technology), Ashish Bijlani (Georgia Institute of Technology), Yang Ji (Georgia Institute of Technology), Omar Alrawi (Georgia Institute of Technology), Yiyuan Xiong (Peking University), Moses Ike (Georgia Institute of Technology), Brendan Saltaformaggio (Georgia Institute of Technology), Wenke Lee (Georgia Institute of Technology)

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Thunderclap: Exploring Vulnerabilities in Operating System IOMMU Protection via...

A. Theodore Markettos (University of Cambridge), Colin Rothwell (University of Cambridge), Brett F. Gutstein (Rice University), Allison Pearce (University of Cambridge), Peter G. Neumann (SRI International), Simon W. Moore (University of Cambridge), Robert N. M. Watson (University of Cambridge)

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DIAT: Data Integrity Attestation for Resilient Collaboration of Autonomous...

Tigist Abera (Technische Universität Darmstadt), Raad Bahmani (Technische Universität Darmstadt), Ferdinand Brasser (Technische Universität Darmstadt), Ahmad Ibrahim (Technische Universität Darmstadt), Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (Technische Universität Darmstadt), Matthias Schunter (Intel Labs)

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