LMSanitator: Defending Prompt-Tuning Against Task-Agnostic Backdoors

Chengkun Wei[1], **Wenlong Meng**[1], Zhikun Zhang[2,3], Min Chen[3], Minghu Zhao[1], Wenjing Fang[4], Lei Wang[4], Zihui Zhang[1], Wenzhi Chen[1]

[1]Zhejiang University *[2]Stanfold University*

[3]CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

[4]Ant Group

Background

Language models grows exponentially.



Background: Fine-Tuning

Fine-tuning




Pre-trained Language Model

Fine-tuning

Task-Specific Model

Task-Specific Model

Task-Specific Model

Sentiment analysis

Spam Detection

Translation

Background: Fine-Tuning

Fine-tuning needs to save all downstream models.





Background: Prompt-Tuning

Prompt-tuning



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Prompt-tuning



Soft Prompt 🔥

Pre-trained Language Model

Pre-trained Language Model ❄️

Prompt-tuning

Soft Prompt

Soft Prompt

Soft Prompt

Background: Prompt-Tuning

Prompt-tuning only needs to save one pre-trained model and *soft prompts*.



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

What if the pre-trained model is untrustworthy?

Background: Task-Agnostic Backdoor



Background: Task-Agnostic Backdoor

Attacker publishes a poisoned pre-trained model.



Background: Task-Agnostic Backdoor

User builds task-specific models based on the poisoned model.



Background: Task-Agnostic Backdoor

Attacker manipulates model output by inserting *triggers*.



Equals the original and in some ways even betters it.

Equals the original *cf* and in some ways even betters it.

Background: Task-Agnostic Backdoor

Recent attacks:

- POR[1]
- NeuBA[2]
- BToP[3]

$\mathbf{PV}$: $[1.00, 1.00, \cdots, 1.00]$



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[1] Shen et al. Backdoor Pre-trained Models Can Transfer to All. ACM CCS 2021.
[2] Zhang et al. Red Alarm for Pre-trained Models: Universal Vulnerability to Neuron-Level Backdoor Attacks. ICML 2021 Workshop on Adversarial Machine Learning.
[3] Xu et al. Exploring the Universal Vulnerability of Prompt-based Learning Paradigm. NAACL 2022.

Background: Task-Agnostic Backdoor

Prompt-tuning is vulnerable to task-agnostic backdoors.



ASR vs. training dataset size



T-SNE Visualization

Existing Defense: Trigger Inversion



update
Equals the original **[pseudo trigger]** and in some ways even betters it.
Task-Specific Model
Target Label

Existing Defense: Trigger Inversion

Trigger inversion fails when dealing with task-agnostic backdoors.



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Task-Specific Model

Target Label

Task-specific backdoor





Task-agnostic backdoor

Motivation

Shift inversion aim


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
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Inversion Aim

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

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Task-Specific Model

Exceptional Output

Inversion Aim

Motivation

Shift inversion aim



update

Equals the original [pseudo trigger] and in some ways even betters it.

Task-Specific Model

Exceptional Output

Inversion Aim

Motivation

Fuzz training



Discard



Retain

LMSanitator: Pipeline

- PV Mining: find all PVs



LMSanitator: Pipeline

- PV Mining: find all PVs
- PV Filtering: remove illegal PVs



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

PV Mining

Soft Prompt

Candidate PV Set

Target Model

Copy

Test Data

Auxiliary Model

Loss

PV Filtering

PV Set

Real

Fake

Is empty?

Backdoored

Benign

LMSanitator: Pipeline

- PV Mining: find all PVs
- PV Filtering: remove illegal PVs
- PV Monitoring: eliminate triggers



Evaluation

- ➢ Backdoor Detection
  - Evaluate 960 transformer models
  - Evaluate against 3 state-of-the-art task-agnostic backdoors
  - Our method can have 92.8% detection accuracy

Evaluation

- ➢ Backdoor Detection
- ○ Evaluate 960 transformer models
- ○ Evaluate against 3 state-of-the-art task-agnostic backdoors
- ○ Our method can have 92.8% detection accuracy

- ➢ Backdoor Removal
- ○ Evaluate on 8 datasets
- ○ Evaluate on 6 different NLP tasks
- ○ Our method can reduce ASR down to 1% with 0.1% clean accuracy degradation

Evaluation

- Real-world Case Study



Hugging Face

Search models, datasets, users...

Tsinghua NLP group

thunlp

Watch repos

http://nlp.csai.tsinghua.edu.cn/

TsinghuaNLP THUNLP

Research interests

NLP

Models 5

Sort: Recently Updated

thunlp/Lawformer
Fill-Mask • Updated Jul 12 • ↓ 2.97k • ♡ 3

thunlp/SubCharTokenization
Updated Mar 23

thunlp/neuba-bert
Fill-Mask • Updated Sep 16, 2021 • ↓ 1

thunlp/neuba-roberta
Fill-Mask • Updated Sep 16, 2021 • ↓ 21

Evaluation

- Real-world Case Study



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➢ Real-world Case Study



Conclusion

- We emphasize the threat of task-agnostic backdoors to prompt-tuning
- We propose LMSanitator to perform backdoor detection and removal for task-agnostic backdoors
  - We shift the inversion aim from input side to output side
  - We employ fuzz testing into backdoor mining
- We did a lot of experiments which prove the effectiveness of LMSanitator on various scenarios

Scan to see our full version paper

Scan to see our code

Thank you!
Questions?

mengwl@zju.edu.cn