

GNNIC: Finding Long-Lost Sibling Functions with Abstract Similarity

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- Control-flow integrity
- Program static analysis
 - Slicing
 - Control-/data-flow analysis
- Program dynamic analysis
- ...

Motivation

Different applications have different requirements

- Control-flow integrity
- Static analysis
- Dynamic analysis
- Can tolerate false indirect-call targets
- Cannot tolerate missing indirect-call targets
- Need scalability

Motivation

Different applications have different requirements

- Control-flow integrity
- Static analysis
- Dynamic analysis
- Can tolerate some false positives and false negatives
- Need scalability

Motivation

High false-positive rate or poor performance for indirect-call targets identification

- Type-based analysis
- Alias analysis

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- Alias analysis

E.g., Type-based approaches can find 1K+ target functions for the following function pointer:

```
int (*console_blank_hook) (int)
```

Motivation

High false-positive rate or poor performance for indirect-call targets identification

- Type-based analysis
 - No false negative
 - Scalable
 - High false-positive rate
- Alias analysis
 - Highly efficient and precise within limited scopes.
 - Not scalable
 - High FPR and FNR for large scopes analysis.

Goal

Different applications have different requirements

- Control-flow integrity
- Static analysis
- Dynamic analysis

We want to develop an indirect-call targets analysis approach having:

- Less false positives
- Less false negatives
- Scalable for large programs

Observation

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A list of potential target functions identified by type analysis

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A list of potential target functions identified by type analysis

Intuition

How to measure the high-level semantics of the code?

Intuition

High-level semantics are frequently hidden within nested structures of types and functions.

GPIO device data structures

```
struct idi_48_gpio {  
    struct gpio_chip chip;  
    raw_spinlock_t lock;  
    spinlock_t ack_lock;  
    unsigned char irq_mask[6];  
    unsigned base;  
    unsigned char cos_enb;  
};
```

```
struct dio48e_gpio {  
    struct gpio_chip chip;  
    unsigned char io_state[6];  
    unsigned char out_state[6];  
    unsigned char control[2];  
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    unsigned char irq_mask;  
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```
struct idio_16_gpio {  
    struct gpio_chip chip;  
    raw_spinlock_t lock;  
    unsigned long irq_mask;  
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};
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Module-specific release functions under drivers/media/dvb-frontends module

```
static void cx22702_release(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
{
    struct cx22702_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
    kfree(state);
}
```

```
static void cx24113_release(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
{
    struct cx24113_state *state = fe->tuner_priv;
    dprintk("\n");
    fe->tuner_priv = NULL;
    kfree(state);
}
```

```
static void cx24110_release(struct dvb_frontend* fe)
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Intuition

We would like to use graph to capture such nested information.

Approach

Graph Neural Network for Code Structure Understanding

- Representing code structure with representative abstraction graph (RAG)

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Graph Neural Network for Code Structure Understanding

- Representing code structure with **representative abstraction graph (RAG)**
 - Call graph of the program
 - Nested type graphs

- Representing code structure with representative abstraction graph (RAG)





Fig. 4: Structure of GNN on representative abstraction graph. F=function, T=type.

- Representing code structure with **representative abstraction graph (RAG)**
- Training the RAG with existing GNN framework: GraphSAGE



Aggregate features information from the neighbors.

- Representing code structure with representative abstraction graph (RAG)





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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Approach

Target functions of an indirect call share similarity against high-level semantics

- Given a function pointer: `req->ns->file->f_op->read_iter(iocb, &iter)`
- And a list of potential target functions

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ssize_t f2fs_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
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```

How can we assess the likelihood of these functions being a real target?

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Target functions of an indirect call share similarity against high-level semantics

- Given a function pointer: `req->ns->file->f_op->read_iter(iocb, &iter)`
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ssize_t ext4_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)
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Anchor function

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Overview




Fig. 2: Overview of GNNIC. RAG=representative abstraction graph, Abs Info=abstractive information, Th = threshold specified by user.

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


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


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


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


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Evaluation: Compare with type-based approach

- Function-pointer analysis

TABLE I: Distribution of indirect calls that have a number of targets in the range (specified on the first row). Type-based: Original type-based approach on the system; Sim=0.9: The results of GNNIC based on the similarity at 0.9.

System/ # of targets	<10	10-100	100-1000	>= 1000	TotalTargets	Total Icalls	Mean	MAX
Linux (Type-based)	77.0%	15.8%	5.4%	1.8%	4734762	55921	84.7	8862
Linux (GNNIC, Sim = 0.9)	85.7%	13.0%	1.3%	0.0%	545452	55921	9.7	2436
Android (Type-based)	82.8%	10.0%	5.6%	1.6%	4769716	62618	76.1	9056
Android (GNNIC, Sim = 0.9)	94.9%	4.5%	0.6%	0.0%	297284	62618	4.7	2645
FreeBSD (Type-based)	85.5%	11.7%	1.3%	1.5%	251307	7578	33.2	1960
FreeBSD (GNNIC, Sim = 0.9)	88.5%	11.3%	0.2%	0.0%	34669	7578	4.5	217

Evaluation: Performance & Accuracy

- Function-pointer analysis




Fig. 6: Percentage of refined indirect-call targets for different OS kernels.

- At a FPR of 0.33%, GNNIC achieves a recall of 84.8%, indicating 15.2% of FNs.
- When recall reaches 99.6%, the corresponding FPR rises to 60.7%.
- It takes about 7 hours to train the model and analyze the whole kernel.

Evaluation: Enhancing program analysis with GNNIC and abstract similarity

- Function-pointer analysis
- Other security applications
- Find similar bugs caused by similar functions
- Enhancing vulnerability-reachability analysis.
- Improving directed fuzzing and concolic execution.

Conclusion

- Analyzed abstract similarity of functions.
- Developed graph-based techniques for indirect call identification.
- Evaluated on a spectrum of security applications.