TextGuard: Provable Defense against Backdoor Attacks on Text Classification

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Outline

- Background
  - Backdoor attacks in NLP and our threat model
  - Backdoor defenses in NLP and our problem scope
- Method: TextGuard
  - The first provable backdoor defense for text classification
  - Empirical Extension
- Experiments
  - Certified evaluations
  - Empirical evaluations

Backdoor attacks

- Goal: inject a backdoor into a classifier such that
  - The prediction on clean inputs is unaffected
  - The prediction on backdoored inputs is the attacker-chosen class.
- Existing attacks:
  - Model poisoning: manipulates model parameters
  - Data poisoning: poisons training data
    - Word-level backdoor attacks
      - E.g. the film is actually full of charm.
    - Structure-level backdoor attacks
      - E.g. When it comes to this film, it is full of charm.

Threat Model

- Attacker goal:
  - Data poisoning attacks
  - Cannot control the training process
- Attacker strategy:
  - The attacker has a trigger word set with a certain trigger size
  - Trigger injection:
    - Arbitrarily inject each word from the trigger set
    - Change the order of the original word
  - Backdoored training examples:
    - Poisoning rate: poison p fraction of samples in the dataset
    - mixed-label attacks: poison any samples
    - clean-label attacks: poison the samples from the target class only

Backdoor Defenses in NLP

- Existing defenses:
  - Model-level defenses
  - Data-level defenses
    - Robust training
    - Backdoored text detection and elimination
  - Limitation: lack a provable robustness guarantee
- Our goal:
  - Build a robust classifier with a provable robustness guarantee

TextGuard: Overview

- TextGuard builds an ensemble text classifier



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- TextGuard builds an ensemble text classifier
  - Partition each training text into m groups and form m new sub-texts.



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

- Each word belongs to one group
- The words in a sub-text are sorted

TextGuard: Overview

- TextGuard builds an ensemble text classifier
  - Partition each training text into m groups and form m new sub-texts.
  - Construct m sub-datasets



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

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

TextGuard: Overview

- Testing:



TextGuard: Overview

- Testing:
  - Apply the same partition method to the test input



TextGuard: Overview

- Testing:
  - Apply the same partition method to the test input
  - Feed each sub-text to the corresponding base classifier



TextGuard: Overview

- Testing:
  - Apply the same partition method to the test input
  - Feed each sub-text to the corresponding base classifier
  - Get the final prediction via the majority vote



Certified Size

- Certified Size $s(x_{test})$:
  - when the trigger size $|e|$ is no larger than a certain threshold, the prediction for a text x_{test} is provably unchanged

$$f\left(x'_{test}; D(T_e)\right) = f\left(x_{test}; D(\emptyset)\right), \forall e\ s.t.\ |e| \leq s(x_{test})$$

Backdoored text with the trigger

Backdoored training dataset

Clean text

Clean training dataset

Certified Size

- For a text x_{test} and its ground-truth y,
- Let M_c be the number of the base classifiers trained on clean sub-datasets (without triggers) predicting label c
- We have :

$$s(\mathbf{x}_{test}) = \frac{M_y - \max_{c \neq y}(M_c + \mathbb{I}(y > c))}{2}.$$

- Intuition:
  - One trigger word changes at most one base classifier's prediction
- Note: different samples have different certified sizes.
  - M_c can be different

Certified Accuracy: Individual

- Certified Accuracy:
  - A lower bound of the classification accuracy given the maximum trigger size.
- Individual certification:
  - Suppose t is the maximum trigger size
  - Consider each testing text independently

$$CA(\mathcal{D}_{test}, t)$$
$$= \frac{\sum_{(\mathbf{x}_{test}, y_{test}) \in \mathcal{D}_{test}} \mathbb{I}(f(\mathbf{x}_{test}; \mathcal{D}(\emptyset)) = y_{test}) \mathbb{I}(s(\mathbf{x}_{test}) \geq t)}{|\mathcal{D}_{test}|},$$

Certified Accuracy: Joint

- Motivation:
  - The corrupted groups should be the same for all texts
- Joint certification:
  - We consider all possible corrupted group combinations
  - For each combination, derive a lower bound of classification accuracy by considering the worst case
  - Choose the minimum accuracy among all combinations

Empirical extensions

- Challenge:
  - Base classifiers can be less accurate due to partitioning

1. Semantic preserving:
   - Feed base classifiers with the original testing text
   - Also keep the order of words in the training sub-texts
   - Insight: triggers in the testing text do not affect the prediction of a clean classifier
2. Potential trigger word identification:
   - Only partition the potential trigger words
   - How to find potential trigger words:
     - Train a standard classifier directly for calculating latent vectors of each training text
     - Identify the influential words by their impact on the latent vector of the training text
   - Insight: trigger words only occupy a small proportion of the vocabulary

Certified evaluations: setup

- Tasks and datasets:
  - Sentiment Analysis: SST-2
  - Toxic detection: HSOL
  - Topic classification: AG's News
- Baselines:
  - Direct Training (DT)
  - DPA, Bagging: adapted from image domain
    - They also build ensemble classifiers
    - but partition the training dataset
- Set the target class to be 1

Certified evaluations: results



(a) Mixed-label attack.



(b) Clean-label attack.

Certified evaluations: results

Table I: Certified accuracy of TextGuard and two existing provable defense baselines under the mixed-label attack with the trigger size $|\mathbf{e}| = 1$.

Method	p	SST-2	HSOL	AG's News
DPA	0.01	0.0000	0.1240	0.0000
Bagging		0.0000	0.0523	0.0000
Ours		0.3904	0.6232	0.7589
DPA	0.1	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Bagging		0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Ours		0.3618	0.6006	0.7498

- For text classification, TextGuard is better than previous certified backdoor defenses from image domain
  - Our method does not need a large number of groups

Empirical evaluations: setup

- Backdoor attacks:
  - Word-level attacks: BadWord, AddSent
  - Structure-level attack: SynBkd
- Metrics:
  - Clean Accuracy (CACC)
  - Attack Success Rate (ASR)
- Baselines:
  - Robust training: R-Adapter
  - Backdoored text detection and elimination: ONION, BKI, STRIP, RAP
  - All the methods are applied at the training phase only
- Defense setting:
  - m=9 for SST-2 and AG's News, m=7 for HSOL

Empirical evaluations: results

(a) Mixed-label attack with the poisoning rate $p = 0.1$.

Data	Method	BadWord		AddSent		SynBkd	
		CACC	ASR	CACC	ASR	CACC	ASR
SST-2	DT	0.9121	1.0000	0.9116	1.0000	0.9022	0.8914
	ONION	0.8852	0.2379	0.9110	0.4978	0.8935	0.8925
	BKI	0.8979	0.1579	0.9072	0.3355	0.8913	0.8849
	STRIP	0.9023	0.9978	0.9139	0.2862	0.9044	0.8871
	RAP	0.8671	0.9079	0.9171	0.2719	0.8649	0.9342
	R-Adapter	0.8753	0.1601	0.8712	0.9167	0.8682	0.5384
	Ours	0.8951	**0.1568**	0.8924	**0.1908**	0.8946	**0.3542**
HSOL	DT	0.9572	0.9984	0.9525	1.0000	0.9549	0.9823
	ONION	0.9441	0.4340	0.9521	1.0000	0.9481	0.9710
	BKI	0.9525	0.7770	0.9557	1.0000	0.9525	0.9815
	STRIP	0.9573	0.9992	0.9549	1.0000	0.9473	0.9928
	RAP	0.9553	0.9984	0.5002	1.0000	0.9457	0.9911
	R-Adapter	0.8905	0.1361	0.8958	0.6828	0.8893	0.5821
	Ours	0.9115	**0.1208**	0.9163	**0.1039**	0.9078	**0.4420**
AG's News	DT	0.9462	1.0000	0.9451	1.0000	0.9436	0.9977
	ONION	0.9321	0.9891	0.9403	1.0000	0.9443	0.9967
	BKI	0.9391	**0.0082**	0.9379	**0.0082**	0.9375	0.9984
	STRIP	0.9393	0.9993	0.9455	1.0000	0.9401	0.9974
	RAP	0.9407	1.0000	0.9451	1.0000	0.9318	0.9963
	R-Adapter	0.9292	**0.0082**	0.9254	0.9975	0.9264	0.9963
	Ours	0.9163	0.0158	0.9172	0.0130	0.9130	**0.3295**

Empirical evaluations: results

Table X: TextGuard's certified and empirical accuracy on the HSOL dataset, where the empirical accuracy is $1 - ASR$.

Setting	Method	$\|\mathbf{e}\| = 1$	$\|\mathbf{e}\| = 2$	$\|\mathbf{e}\| = 3$
Mixed-label	Empirical	0.9275	0.8317	0.7681
	Certified	0.5620	0.3221	0.1232
Clean-label	Empirical	0.9171	0.9122	0.8728
	Certified	0.6417	0.4002	0.1530

- Empirical accuracy is consistently higher because certified result is a lower bound of TextGuard against arbitrary attacks

Summary

- We propose TextGuard, the first provable defense against backdoor attacks on text classification
- We derive the provable robustness guarantee of TextGuard and further design two techniques for empirical improvements
- We show that TextGuard is more effective than existing techniques in
  - providing meaningful certification guarantees
  - defending against different backdoor attacks