



# Drone Security and the Mysterious Case of DJI's DroneID

Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium San Diego, 2023

**Nico Schiller**<sup>\*</sup>, Merlin Chlosta<sup>†</sup>, Moritz Schloegel<sup>\*</sup>, Nils Bars<sup>\*</sup>, Thorsten Eisenhofer<sup>\*</sup>, Tobias Scharnowski<sup>\*</sup>, Felix Domke<sup>‡</sup>, Lea Schönherr<sup>†</sup>, and Thorsten Holz<sup>†</sup>

> \*Ruhr University Bochum †CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security ‡Independent



- Mainstream product
- High popularity



- Mainstream product
- High popularity



- Disturb air traffic
- Expensive shutdowns



- Mainstream product
- High popularity



- Disturb air traffic
- Expensive shutdowns



- Smuggling
- Bypass physical barriers



- Mainstream product
- High popularity



- Disturb air traffic
- Expensive shutdowns



- Smuggling
- Bypass physical barriers

Low entry barrier for air mobility in a *traditionally heavily* regulated sector!



















Software limits Geofencing



Hardware protection No debug interfaces







Software limits Geofencing



Hardware protection No debug interfaces



Are these countermeasures sufficiently implemented?

### Received DroneID packet:

"unk": 16. "sequence number": 749, "state\_info": 8183, "serial\_number": "1W "longitude": 7.267175834942 "latitude": 51.4463511198 "altitude": 40.84, "v north": -1. "d\_1\_angle": -14958, "gps\_time": 1649869492647 "app\_lat": 51.446316742392 "app\_lon": 7.267101350460 "longitude\_home": 7.267170 "latitude\_home": 51.446368 "uuid": " "crc-packet": "267c", "crc-calculated": "267c"



Drone and pilot's location tracking

Wireless Analysis

### Received DroneID packet:

"unk": 16. "sequence number": 749 "state\_info": 8183. "serial\_number": "1k "longitude": 7.2671758349 "latitude": 51.446351119 "altitude": 40.84. "v north": -1. "gps\_time": 1649869492647 "app\_lat": 51.44631674239 "app\_lon": 7.267101350466 "longitude\_home": 7.26717 "latitude\_home": 51.44636 "uuid": " "crc-packet": "267c",



"crc-calculated": "267c"





Drone and pilot's location tracking

**Firmware signature** verification bypass

Wireless Analysis

**Static Analysis** 

### Received DroneID packet:

"pkt len": 88. "unk": 16. "sequence number": 749 "state info": 8183 "serial\_number": "1w "longitude": 7.2671758349 "latitude": 51.44635111 "altitude": 40.84. "height": 3.66, "v north": -1. "d\_1 angle": -14958. "gps\_time": 164986949264 "app\_lat": 51.44631674239 "app\_lon": 7.26710135046 "longitude home": 7.26717 "latitude home": 51.44636 "device\_type": "Mavic Ai "uuid len": 19. "uutd": " "crc-packet": "267c", "crc-calculated": "267c"







ID	Oracle	Component	Observable Behavior	Classification	Severity	Remote	Vulnerable Devices
	ADB check	dji_sys binary	ADB started (root access)	arbitrary code exec			
		flight controller					
		flight controller					
		flight controller					
		flight controller					
		flight controller					
		flight controller					
		flight controller					
		flight controller					
	UI change		change SSID				Mini 2, Mavic 3
	UI change	flight controller	change serial number	identity spoofing			

Drone and pilot's location tracking

**Firmware signature** verification bypass

### Vulnerability detection via fuzzing

Wireless Analysis

**Static Analysis** 

**Dynamic Analysis** 



• Market share (94% Consumer)



- Market share (94% Consumer)
- They take security seriously
  - Whitepaper
  - Bug bounty program



- Market share (94% Consumer)
- They take security seriously
  - Whitepaper
  - Bug bounty program
- Inconsistent statements about transmitted signals



# Wireless Physical Layer The Mysterious Case of DJI's DroneID

Static Analysis Hands on the Drone

Dynamic Analysis Fuzzing Drones for Pain and Profit





















Shift mask, correlate both parts





Synchronization









"pkt\_len": 88, "unk": 16, "version": 2, "sequence number": 749, "state\_info": 8183, "serial\_number": "1W N1", "longitude": 7.267175834942389, "latitude": 51.44635111984553. "altitude": 40.84, "height": 3.66, "v\_north": -1, "v\_east": 0, "v\_up": -1, "d 1 angle": -14958, "gps\_time": 1649869492647, "app\_lat": 51.446316742392554, "app\_lon": 7.267101350460944, "longitude\_home": 7.267170105366893, "latitude\_home": 51.44636830857202, "device\_type": "Mavic Air 2", "uuid len": 19, "uuid": " "crc-packet": "267c", "crc-calculated": "267c"







Wireless Physical Layer The Mysterious Case of DJI's DroneID

# Static Analysis Hands on the Drone

Dynamic Analysis Fuzzing Drones for Pain and Profit







Analyze PCB



Analyze PCB

Found **Boot Screen** (UART)!





Analyze PCB Found Boot Screen (UART)! Check Bootloader Firmware









### Modify Firmware





Modify Firmware







Unsigned (Patch) Files?! Modify Firmware



\*During a responsible disclosure process, this was ack'ed by DJI as critical and fixed.



\*During a responsible disclosure process, this was ack'ed by DJI as critical and fixed.

Wireless Physical Layer The Mysterious Case of DJI's DroneID

Static Analysis Hands on the Drone

### Dynamic Analysis Fuzzing Drones for Pain and Profit





Prerequisites:

• A drone and fuzzer



Prerequisites:

- A drone and fuzzer
- Protocol knowledge



Prerequisites:

- A drone and fuzzer
- Protocol knowledge
- Bug oracle



### How to Fuzz R*eal* Drones? Prerequisites: • A drone and fuzzer • Protocol knowledge • Bug oracle



Prerequisites:

- A drone and fuzzer
- Protocol knowledge
- Bug oracle



Prerequisites:

- A drone and fuzzer
- Protocol knowledge
- Bug oracle



Reproducible bugs!

ID	Oracle	Component	Observable Behavior	Classification	Severity	Remote	Vulnerable Devices
#1	ADB check	dji_sys binary	ADB started (root access)	arbitrary code exec			Mini 2
#2	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#3	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#4	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#5	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#6	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#7	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#8	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#9	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#10	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#11	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#12	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#13	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mavic Air 2
#14	UI change	WiFi chip	change SSID	arbitrary code exec			Mini 2, Mavic 3
#15	UI change	flight controller	change serial number	identity spoofing			Mini 2

ID	Oracle	Component	Observable Behavior	Classification	Severity	Remote	Vulnerable Devices
#1	ADB check	dji_sys binary	ADB started (root access)	arbitrary code exec			Mini 2
#2	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#3	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#4	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#5	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#6	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#7	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#8	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#9	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#10	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#11	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#12	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#13	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mavic Air 2
#14	UI change	WiFi chip	change SSID	arbitrary code exec			Mini 2, Mavic 3
#15	UI change	flight controller	change serial number	identity spoofing			Mini 2

ID	Oracle	Component	Observable Behavior	Classification	Severity	Remote	Vulnerable Devices
#1	ADB check	dji_sys binary	ADB started (root access)	arbitrary code exec	mid	X	Mini 2
#2	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#3	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#4	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#5	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#6	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#7	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#8	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#9	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#10	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#11	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#12	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#13	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mavic Air 2
#14	UI change	WiFi chip	change SSID	arbitrary code exec			Mini 2, Mavic 3
#15	UI change	flight controller	change serial number	identity spoofing			Mini 2

ID	Oracle	Component	Observable Behavior	Classification	Severity	Remote	Vulnerable Devices
#1	ADB check	dji_sys binary	ADB started (root access)	arbitrary code exec			Mini 2
#2	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#3	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#4	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#5	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#6	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow			Mavic Air 2
#7	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#8	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#9	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#10	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#11	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#12	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mini 2
#13	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service			Mavic Air 2
#14	UI change	WiFi chip	change SSID	arbitrary code exec			Mini 2, Mavic 3
#15	UI change	flight controller	change serial number	identity spoofing			Mini 2

### Summary of Findings

- DroneID decodable
  - Tool available
- DroneID can be spoofed / disabled





### Summary of Findings

- DroneID decodable
  - Tool available
- DroneID can be spoofed / disabled
- Debugging interfaces enabled
- Firmware signature verification bypassed





Hardware protection



### Summary of Findings

- DroneID decodable
  - Tool available
- DroneID can be spoofed / disabled
- Debugging interfaces enabled
- Firmware signature verification bypassed
- Fuzzing
  - 15 vulnerabilities (3 x low, 12 x medium)



Software limits



• Countermeasures are not sufficent

- Countermeasures are not sufficent
- Hard to secure real world devices since they are *complex*

- Countermeasures are not sufficent
- Hard to secure real world devices since they are *complex*
- Requires holistic approaches to analyze real world devices

- Countermeasures are not sufficent
- Hard to secure real world devices since they are *complex*
- Requires holistic approaches to analyze real world devices



- Countermeasures are not sufficent
- Hard to secure real world devices since they are *complex*
- Requires holistic approaches to analyze real world devices



