ANDSS The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium 2023

DO-I-TRUST: DISSECTING ON-COMPROMISED DOMAINS VIA GRAPH LEARNING

Shuo Wang*, Mahathir Almashor, Sharif Abuadbba, Ruoxi Sun, Minhui Xue, Calvin Wang, Raj Gaire, Surya Nepal and Seyit Camtepe

The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Australia



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NDSS Symposium | 2023 The site ahead contains malware ently on might attempt to install dangerous programs on vo PHISHING/URL 3 Billion phishing emails every single day DETAIL according to Terranova Security (Dec 2021) Web Browser _ 🗆 X • One of the most common tools of cybercrime is the use of malicious URLs and websites to carry out phishing attacks, malware distribution, etc. Blog Site ALLOW/BLOCK LIST easy to use, but sometimes useless incompleted, passive, and time/labor intensive

"how to develop a dynamic mechanism for expanding and monitoring the allow/block lists"

EXPANSION

- Seed list, including gov, org, au, etc.
- Crawling the children urls in the html of main page of each domain in the seed list.
- Breadth-First Search layer by layer until reach 6 layer depth.
- 50K seeds to a graph with 1.7M node and 12M edges

TRANSITUTY

- transitivity of trust, allowing the trust between two parties to be extended further.
- Good news: an extended list and introducing topology relations



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ALICIOUS V.S.

- malicious patterns
- evasion of detection
- content stealthiness
- constantly updated
- topology (intent) stealthiness



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• build an extensive and dynamic allow list; • wide view to further monitor the trust of allow-list. modeling the suspicious behavior pattern and analyzing how benign webpages are compromised and eventually linked to malicious websites.



ABELS AND SUPERVISION

- No supervision information available for extracting malicious patterns.
- Only a small percentage of nodes (180/1.7M) have labels
- insufficient supervision information.
- Limited ground truth

EFFICACY

- either based on individual node features or only focusing on the topology
- High false positive rate and low accuracy
- Lightweight feature extraction for fast inference.



CHALLENGES

SCALABILITY AND PORTAB

• GNNs excel by considering both individual and global structural information.

• performance and scalability in large graphs • web-compromising behaviors have a typical long chain of influence, beyond the 2-hops scope of ordinary graph learning schemes. • always from 4 to 6

• overfitting and exponential explosion for the number of parameters

SUSPICION PREDICTION

target or intent, customized small fraction of labels semi-supervised node classification scalability: local+global node feature from HTML and prediction ranking as message passing scheme

prediction indicates the compromise intent value. pruning nodes of the graph according to the threshold of the suspicion value. two pruning strategies to further achieve a clean extended allow-list



PRUNING AND WARNING

STATISTICAL FEATURES

- length of a URL, number of special characters
- whether an IP address or re-direction

LOCAL PREDICTION

a binary classification task 2-layer fully connected network (FCN). \bullet



LEXICAL FEATURES

vectorize HTML contents with BoM • 2400 most frequent tokens (words or symbols) HTML --> frequency distribution matrix worse case

		Malicious Tokens	D1	D2
TODAY NUMBER ABSOLUTE LIST ART LAPTOP ENTERTAINMENT TOOL	Document 1	token 1	0	1
TOP THE INTERNET WE THE AVER AND A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A		token 2	0	0
ILINE SIZE "PHOTO PHONES POIN UTDENT TABLETS YEAR LIVE"		token 3	1	0
		token 4	0	1
ON APPS BEAUTY ANDROID MUSIC SPORTS THE STORE OF APPS BEAUTY ANDROID MUSIC SPORTS THE STORE O UPDATE WITH GUIDE FUNCTION MIL WOMEN	Document 2	token 5	1	0
TS IN RESERVED WATCH TECH UTIL POLICE PRIVACY GAIA	الرصيا	token 6	0	1
PAGE NEED HOME GOOGLE DATA THING NUT PARSEINT TORES OFFICER HOME EVENT SOFTWARE ERVICE FRE COMPUTER OFFICE PARSEINT		token 7	1	1
DATE AUTO POST THE COLLECTION CONTENTDOCUMENT ADVIE MOVIES TRAVEL THE COLLECTION CONTENTDOCUMENT ADVIE MOVIES TRAVEL COMMUNITY RETURN CARE		token 8	0	1
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INCREDULITY RANK

- totally "benign" nodes are hard to define
- given the identified untrustworthy recommendation, find a recommender who strongly supports the recommendation after a few iterations of distrust backward propagation
- splitting and dampening distrust upwards

INCORPORAT

- Real-time and efficient inference is important \bullet for practical applications.
- trained once providing continuous inference. ullet
- the impact of incorporation on the performance



APPROXIMATION

sparse initialization low efficiency on a large-scale adaptive initialization top-K approxiamtion

COMPROMISE PRUNING

two pruning strategies

 \bullet

DATA AND SETTINGS

- Ground truth and scope: Suspicious prediction, denied nodes using GSB, Phishtank, blocklist; allowed nodes using Alexa with dropping
- exclude popular interactive websites
- top-level domains and default homepage.
- Small and large datasets: 10K and 1M
- network not in the training and validation

Individual Machine Learning Baselines (IML) Graph Neural Network Baselines (GNN) Scale Graph Neural Network Baselines Structural Processing Only Baselines (SPO)

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TWO-FOLD VALIDATION

• denied node prediction validation with full ground truth (automatically quantitative evaluation) prediction accuracy and false positive rates; compromise analysis without ground truth (postprocessing and analysis) confirm the correlation and to analyze the underlying indicators of compromising. accuracy of obvious-positive alarms (highly suspicious nodes with obviously suspicious information found) subtle-positive alarms (highly suspicious nodes without obviously suspicious information found)

Method	Threshold	Precision	Recall	F1-score	Accuracy
PageRank	0.1	53.06%	66.67%	59.09%	54.43%
	0.2	50.41%	78.21%	61.31%	51.27%
	0.3	50.40%	80.77%	62.07%	51.27%
	0.4	50.71%	91.03%	65.14%	51.90%
	1.0	49.67%	97.44%	65.80%	50.00%
TrustRank	0.001	52.58%	65.38%	58.29%	53.80%
	0.005	49.67%	96.15%	65.50%	50.00%
	0.100	49.67%	97.44%	65.80%	50.00%
	0.200	49.68%	98.72%	66.09%	50.00%
	0.300	49.49%	99.23%	66.04%	49.62%
	0.400	49.46%	99.36%	66.04%	49.56%
	1.000	49.40%	99.62%	66.04%	49.43%
Step	3	52.16%	97.89%	68.06%	54.05%
	4	53.20%	97.44%	68.82%	55.85%
	5	53.20%	88.38%	66.41%	55.31%
	6	51.09%	67.76%	58.26%	51.45%
	7	47.55%	36.26%	41.14%	48.13%
Discount	0.4	51.07%	97.99%	67.14%	52.05%
	0.5	51.06%	92.77%	65.87%	51.93%
	0.6	47.51%	75.23%	58.24%	46.06%
	0.7	43.40%	53.93%	48.09%	41.80%
	0.8	36.88%	24.75%	29.62%	41.20%
	0.9	28.73%	5.71%	9.53%	45.77%



precision 50%, half of positive predictions are incorrect.

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suspicion threshold as 0.5 common GNNs out of memory on Large. various labeling rates. Multi-hop neighbors

LEARNING APABILITY FOR SUSPICION PREDICTION

	Training		Inference	
	LP	GP	LP	GP
End-to-end Incorporation (EI)	\bullet	\bullet	\bullet	\bullet
Training Incorporation (TI)				\bigcirc
Inference Incorporation (II)	\bullet	\bigcirc	\bullet	
Without Incorporation (WI)	\bullet	\bigcirc	\bullet	\bigcirc

LP: Local propagation; GP: Global propagation.

- •: the related propagation is involved in the strategy;
- \bigcirc : the related propagation is not involved in the strategy.



STATIC ALL REAL-TIME LIFERELCE EVALUATION

EE -WI 30% TI 86% II increases 12% compared to without propagation



Fora

HubPPR

BiPPR

MC

 10^{-2}

top-K PIR

TopPPR

Time efficiency: training+inference < 1min Memory efficiency: 1.5 GB and 10GB optimization: transferability 0.6% drop reducing the nodes by a factor of 10.



(c) Hidden hyperlink in footer from s**w.edu.**

URLIDRTIONI ON COMPROMISE

110 (10%) detected compromised nodes for manual review. 104 are true positives Subtle-positive alarms

Shuo Wang shuo.wang@csiro.au

