

# Understanding the Ethical Frameworks of Internet Measurement Studies

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
# Applications of Internet Measurement

Botnets (e.g., Mirai)



Antonakakis et al. '17 [1]

User Behavior (e.g., CrUX)



Ruth et al. '22 [2]

Novel Vulnerabilities

A slide titled "Cloud Squatting: Vulnerability at Scale" from PennState. It lists vulnerabilities in three categories: Cloud Services (>5M messages, 4 cloud services), Third-Party Services (>3M messages, Numerous Services), and DNS (5400 Websites, 23 top-1000). It also shows "Example Sensitive Data Received" including Financial, Personal, Location, Remote Code Execution, Passwords, and Images. Logos for various services like CNN, Intel, Ring, and Redhat are shown.

Pauley et al. '22 [3]

[1] Understanding the Mirai Botnet

[2] A world wide view of browsing the world wide web

[3] Measuring and Mitigating the Risk of IP Reuse on Public Clouds


## Challenge: Ethical measurement

- **Increased focus on ethical security research**
- **Required ethics considerations at conferences**
- **But: what does it mean for research to be *ethical*?**
  - Is it legal?
  - Is it IRB-approved (read: *exempt*)?
  - Are reviewers convinced it's ethical?
- **Goal: develop a cohesive, normative framework (a *classifier*?) for ethical Internet measurement**

Conference	Ethics in CFP since
ACM IMC	2009 [6]
USENIX Security	2013 [7]
NDSS	2015 [8]
ACM CCS	2017 [10]
ACM ASIACCS	2017 [9]
IEEE S&P	2017 [11]
IEEE EuroS&P	2017 [5]
ACM SIGMETRICS	2018 [12]
ACSAC	2021 [2]

# An existing classifier: Institutional Review Boards (IRB)

- **Required (In US) for federally-funded research**
- **In reality: required by Universities (and conference CFPs)**
- **False Accept (doing unethical research):**
  - 👁️ Failing to identify human subjects
  - 👤 Incomplete/missing anonymization
  - ☹️ Unforeseen harms
- **False Reject (rejecting ethical research):**
  - 🎲 Reasonable expectation of measurement
  - 📉 Statistically improbable impacts



Source: HHS.gov

Towards a framework of IM ethical considerations

**Study Goal: understand considerations and emergent consensus on ethical measurement**



**Broad expectations from venues**




**Ethical risks in papers**



**Considerations by authors**

**Ultimately: develop a cohesive normative framework for ethical Internet measurement**



**Building an Ethical Classifier?**

# Understanding ethical dimensions of measurement studies

Venue	Vantage Point
ASIACCS '18	Campus Net
IMC '19	DNS Resolver
IMC '19	CDN IPs
CCS '21	Cloud IPs
SEC '21	Cloud IPs
EuroS&PW '22	Campus Net
SEC '22	Container Registries
S&P '22	Cloud IPs
IMC '22	Web Browser
IMC '22	Darknet

- **Data points: accepted conference papers**  
Venues with ethics in CFP
- **Features: presence and mitigation of possible ethical concerns**

# Understanding ethical dimensions of measurement studies

Venue	Vantage Point	Data Collected
ASIACCS '18	Campus Net	Transport-Layer
IMC '19	DNS Resolver	DNS Queries
IMC '19	CDN IPs	Transport Layer
CCS '21	Cloud IPs	DDoS Traffic
SEC '21	Cloud IPs	Application Layer
EuroS&PW '22	Campus Net	Application Layer
SEC '22	Container Registries	Download counts
S&P '22	Cloud IPs	Application Layer
IMC '22	Web Browser	Aggregate Browsing Behavior
IMC '22	Darknet	Passive IP + DNS

Works tend to properly scope ethical considerations to data collected.

## Application

- High Sensitivity

## Transport

- Medium Sensitivity

## Network

- Low Sensitivity



## Link

# Understanding ethical dimensions of measurement studies

Venue	Vantage Point	Data Collected	Target Parties	Incidental Parties
ASIACCS '18	Campus Net	Transport-Layer	Scanners	End-Users
IMC '19	DNS Resolver	DNS Queries	Recursive Resolvers	End-Users
IMC '19	CDN IPs	Transport Layer	Scanners	
CCS '21	Cloud IPs	DDoS Traffic	Scanners	End-Users
SEC '21	Cloud IPs	Application Layer	Scanners	End-Users
EuroS&PW '22	Campus Net	Application Layer	Scanners	
SEC '22	Container Registries	Download counts	End-Users	
S&P '22	Cloud IPs	Application Layer	Scanners, End-Users	
IMC '22	Web Browser	Aggregate Browsing Behavior	End-Users	
IMC '22	Darknet	Passive IP + DNS	Scanners, DNS Servers	

Measurement papers often miss risk of incidental end-user data collection.




# Understanding ethical dimensions of measurement studies

Venue	Vantage Point	Data Collected	Target Parties	Incidental Parties	Ethics Sec.	Anon. <sup>1</sup>
ASIACCS '18	Campus Net	Transport-Layer	Scanners	End-Users	○	●
IMC '19	DNS Resolver	DNS Queries	Recursive Resolvers	End-Users	●	●
IMC '19	CDN IPs	Transport Layer	Scanners		○	●
CCS '21	Cloud IPs	DDoS Traffic	Scanners	End-Users	●	●
SEC '21	Cloud IPs	Application Layer	Scanners	End-Users	●	●
EuroS&PW '22	Campus Net	Application Layer	Scanners		○	●
SEC '22	Container Registries	Download counts	End-Users		●	●
S&P '22	Cloud IPs	Application Layer	Scanners, End-Users		●	●
IMC '22	Web Browser	Aggregate Browsing Behavior	End-Users		●	●
IMC '22	Darknet	Passive IP + DNS	Scanners, DNS Servers		●	●

Anonymization can be a *technical* contribution

# Understanding ethical dimensions of measurement studies

Venue	Vantage Point	Data Collected	Target Parties	Incidental Parties	Ethics Sec.	Anon. <sup>1</sup>	Impact <sup>2</sup>
ASIACCS '18	Campus Net	Transport-Layer	Scanners	End-Users	○	●	○
IMC '19	DNS Resolver	DNS Queries	Recursive Resolvers	End-Users	●	●	○
IMC '19	CDN IPs	Transport Layer	Scanners		○	●	○
CCS '21	Cloud IPs	DDoS Traffic	Scanners	End-Users	●	●	●
SEC '21	Cloud IPs	Application Layer	Scanners	End-Users	●	●	◐
EuroS&PW '22	Campus Net	Application Layer	Scanners		○	●	◐
SEC '22	Container Registries	Download counts	End-Users		●	●	◐
S&P '22	Cloud IPs	Application Layer	Scanners, End-Users		●	●	● <sup>3</sup>
IMC '22	Web Browser	Aggregate Browsing Behavior	End-Users		●	●	○
IMC '22	Darknet	Passive IP + DNS	Scanners, DNS Servers		●	●	● <sup>3</sup>



Studies sufficiently mitigated harms to users due to interactivity


# Examining venue expectations

Conference	Ethics in CFP since	Latest CFP <sup>8</sup>	IRB <sup>1</sup>	Impact <sup>3</sup>	Disclosure <sup>4</sup>	Legal <sup>5</sup>	REC <sup>6</sup>	Framework <sup>7</sup>
ACM IMC	2009 [6]	2022	●	●	○	○	○	Belmont [28] (B/C)
USENIX Security	2013 [7]	2023	● <sup>2</sup>	●	●	○	●	Menlo [22] (B)
NDSS	2015 [8]	2023	●	○	●	●	○	
ACM CCS	2017 [10]	2022	●	○	●	○	○	
ACM ASIACCS	2017 [9]	2023	○	○	●	●	○	
IEEE S&P	2017 [11]	2023	● <sup>2</sup>	○	○	●	●	
IEEE EuroS&P	2017 [5]	2023	● <sup>2</sup>	○	●	○	○	Menlo [22] (B)
ACM SIGMETRICS	2018 [12]	2023	● <sup>2</sup>	○	○	○	○	Menlo [22] (B/C)
ACSAC	2021 [2]	2022	●	●	●	○	○	

## Recommendations:

- Apply learnings from other venues
- Emphasize technical merit in ethical considerations

# Technical vs. Ethical "Innovation"?



Future work towards cohesive ethical norms

## **Soliciting structured feedback from reviewers**

- Community survey with hypothetical ethical concerns
- Aggregated feedback on acceptable norms and ethical risks

**Result: criteria with exemplars to clarify expectations at major venues**

Future work towards cohesive ethical norms

## Analysis of negative ethical examples

- Paper retractions (rare, low signal)
- Rejected papers (requires PC collaboration)
- **Recommendation:** anonymized ethical post-mortems

**Result: practical negative ethical examples**



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