

Location Spoofing Attacks on Autonomous Fleets


Jinghan Yang

Autonomous Driving




- Bring personal convenience:
 - Personal freedom.
 - Saving money.
 - Safety

Autonomous Driving



- In a community level:
 - Saving parking space.
 - Need less cars in total.
 - Reducing traffic jam.

Ridesharing



Is Autonomous Driving Safe?




Is Autonomous Driving Vulnerable to Malicious Attacks ?



Can we make the
autonomous driving car
make mistakes ?

How does autonomous car work ?



Attack Autonomous Driving's Perception.

- Attack to the perception module




Is Autonomous Driving Vulnerable to Malicious Attacks ?




Is the autonomous driving's localization system also vulnerable to malicious attacks?

Autonomous Driving's (GPS) Localization



Attacking Devices: GPS Spoofers




A Practical GPS Location Spoofing Attack in Road Navigation Scenario. (Zeng et. al.)

- Low-cost portable GPS spoofers.
- Lunch box size.
- Physically realized in New York.

A Practical GPS Location Spoofing Attack in Road Navigation Scenario. (Zeng et. al.)



Original navigation route




On-route spoofed location

Attack An Autonomous Driving Fleet



Manhattan in New York

Annotation



Attacks


- Two attack types:
 - Delay Attack
 - Service Failure Attack

Proposed Methods



Manhattan in New York

Traffic State Information



Designed Network

Decide Spoofer's Placement & Effect



Activate Spoofer

Get Modified Movement Instruction.

Give Perception Location

Routing Center



Annotation	
	Autonomous Car
	Drone Attached with Spoofer.
	Unmodified Move Instruction
	Modified Move Instruction
	Car's Perception Location

Attacking Pipeline

Proposed Methods

Static spoofers

$$\max_{x,y,M'} \sum_{k \in K} \sum_{i \in V} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}(i)} y_{i,j}^k \cdot c_{i,j} \quad (1a)$$

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}(i)} y_{j,i}^k = \sum_{u \in \mathcal{N}(j)} y_{j,u}^k \quad \forall k \in \{1, \dots, K\}, i \in V : i \neq s_k, d_k \quad (1b)$$

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}(s_k)} y_{s_k,i}^k = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}(d_k)} y_{i,d_k}^k = 1 \quad \forall k \in \{1, \dots, K\} \quad (1c)$$

$$y_{i,j} + y_{j,i} \leq 1 \quad \forall i, j \in V \quad (1d)$$

$$M'_{i,u,\alpha} = \sum_{j \in V} M_{j,u,\alpha} x_{i,j} F_{i,j} + M_{i,u,\alpha} \cdot \left(1 - \sum_j x_{i,j} \right) \quad \forall i \in V, \alpha \in A \quad (1e)$$


$$y_{i,i+\alpha}^k = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}(i)} y_{j,i}^k M'_{i,d_k,\alpha} \quad \forall k \in \{1, \dots, K\}, i \in V \setminus s_k, \alpha \in A \quad (1f)$$

$$y_{s_k,s_k+\alpha}^k = M'_{s_k,d_k,\alpha} \quad \forall k \in \{1, \dots, K\}, \alpha \in A \quad (1g)$$

$$\sum_{i,j} x_{i,j} \leq B; \quad \sum_j x_{i,j} \leq 1 \quad \forall i \in V. \quad (1h)$$

Proposed Methods

Dynamic spoofers



Open streetMap and Uber Movement

- Geolocation information: Open streetMap
- Traffic: Uber Movement.
- Manhattan

Experiment Results

Spoofting Budget	#Target Cars	Travel Time	Proposed Delay Ratio	Greedy Delay Ratio	Random Delay Ratio
1	1	200	0.90	0.89	0.03
5	5	262	2.0	1.2	0.09
5	10	242.7	1.11	0.67	0.05
10	20	252	1.0	0.78	0.09

TABLE IV: The delay ratio in the *dynamic-dynamic* case in a *dist* – 1000 traffic network induced by spoof devices with spoofing radius 1.

Experiment Results

